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I. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
The following issues are presented by this Appeal: 
A. Did the District Court commit prejudicial error in 
entering the Order of December 16, 1986, from which this Appeal 
is taken, denying Appellant Bonnie B. Cranney's ("Cranney") 
third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, which Motion was simply 
an attempt by Cranney to have the District Court reconsider its 
previous Orders refusing to set aside the Judgment? 
B. Even if this Appeal is deemed taken from the earlier 
Orders of the District Court dated November 3, 1986 and November 
25, 1986, denying Cranney's first and second Motions to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment, was this Appeal, which was not filed 
until December 30, 1986, timely? 
C. Even if Cranney had timely appealed from the Order of 
November 3, 1986, refusing to set aside the Judgment on the 
ground of excusable neglect, was that first Motion timely in 
view of the fact it was not made within three months after entry 
of Judgment? 
D. Even if Cranney had timely appealed the District 
Court's Order of November 25, 1986 denying Cranney's second 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment on the purported ground the 
Judgment was void, did the District Court commit prejudicial 
error in denying that Motion? 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Respondent Dukane Corporation ("Dukane") sought in this 
action to recover from Cranney the sum of $200,000.00, plus 
interest, due from Cranney pursuant to the terms of a written 
agreement Cranney signed guaranteeing payment of the debts and 
obligations of Cranney Productions, Ltd. ("Cranney 
Productions"). On May 14, 1986, after Cranney had failed to 
attend either the Pretrial Scheduling Conference or the Pretrial 
Settlement Conference, the District Court struck Cranney's 
Answer and entered a Judgment against her. On October 6, 1986, 
Cranney filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment on the ground 
of excusable neglect. That Motion was denied by the Court by 
Order dated November 3, 1986. Cranney did not appeal that 
Order. Rather, Cranney, acting pro se, filed two further 
Motions to set aside the Judgment, both of which were denied by 
the District Court. On December 30, 1986, Cranney finally filed 
this Appeal from the denial of her third Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment. 
B. Objection to Cranney's Statement of Facts. 
Dukane objects to the following matters contained in 
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Cranneyfs Statement of Facts on the basis that there is no 
support in the record for these matters: 
1. Cranney states that a "handwriting expert" has 
found "with a high degree of probability" that Cranney 
may not have signed the guarantee. [Cranney Brief, p. 4] 
Cranney relies upon an apparant letter from one John D. 
Moyes for this statement. [R. 99] That letter was not 
before the Court below (the document purports to be 
notarized on November 17f 1986, which was after the first 
two hearings on Cranney's Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment, although there is no notary stamp on the 
document) and that letter could not properly have been 
considered by the Court as the letter is neither sworn to 
nor is there any foundation for the opinion expressed. 
Finally, the letter simply states that "some evidence 
exists indicating the possible simulation of the 
signature Bonnie 3. Cranney" on the $200,000 guarantee. 
2. Cranney refers to an Affidavit of Donna W. Hagio. 
[Cranney Brief, p. 5] Again, this Affidavit was not 
before the Court below and is not properly a part of the 
Record on Appeal as the Affidavit was not filed until 
January 29, 1987, almost one month after this Appeal was 
filed. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Cranney Productions purchased projectors and related 
equipment from Dukane over a period of several years. Cranney 
was an officer, director, full-time employee and 50% owner of 
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Cranney Productions [Cranney Depo, p. 3-5, R. 124] Cranney 
claims she ceased working at Cranney Productions on March 29, 
1984, the same day she and her former husband separated. 
[Cranney Depo., p. 5-6, R. 124] 
Cranney Productions owed Dukane approximately $280,000 
for the purchase of projectors. Recovery was sought against 
Cranney on the basis that she had signed an agreement 
guaranteeing debts and obligations owing by Cranney Productions 
to Dukane not to exceed $200,000.00. [R. 2-3] In her Answer, 
Cranney denied executing the agreement. [R. 8] In her 
Deposition taken in July, 1985, however, Cranney admitted she 
had signed at least one guarantee agreement to Dukane for what 
she thought was $50,000.00. She testified that the signature on 
the $200,000 guarantee agreement looked like a copy of her 
signature, that she didn't know whether it was her signature for 
sure and that she hadn't seen the document before. Cranney 
admitted telephoning Dukane after she left Cranney Productions 
to inform Dukane not to charge any more to her as she could no 
longer be responsible for charges (all charges for which 
recovery was sought herein were before this). Cranney also 
testified she believed, at the time, she was responsible for 
payment because she was a "fifty-fifty partner". [Cranney 
Depo., p. 8-9, 15 and 17, R. 124] 
Cranney was originally represented in this action by Kay 
M. Lewis. On December 31, 1985, the Court mailed a notice of a 
Scheduling Conference set for January 31, 1986. On January 23, 
1986, Mr. Lewis withdrew as counsel for Cranney. [R. 48-49] 
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Accordingly, Dukane mailed Cranney a Notice to Appoint Counsel 
and notified the Court that the Scheduling Conference should be 
continued to allow Cranney time to obtain new counsel. [R. 51-53] 
On February 13, 1986, the Court mailed to Cranney an 
Order rescheduling the Scheduling Conference for March 3, 1986. 
[R. 54] Cranney failed to appear for the Scheduling Conference. 
[R. 57] At the Scheduling Conference, the Court scheduled the 
trial for May 22, 1986, and scheduled a final Pretrial 
Conference for May 5, 1986. Cranney was sent notice of the 
Pretrial and Trial, which notice specifically informed Cranney 
that: "Non-appearance of any party or attorney unless excused 
may result in an order striking the pleadings of said party." 
[Emphasis in original] [R. 56] I 
Cranney failed to appear for the final Pretrial 
Conference on May 5, 1986, and the Court ordered that her Answer 
be stricken and a Judgment entered against her. A copy of the 
proposed Judgment was sent to Cranney on May 6, 1986. Cranney 
did not file any objection to the proposed Judgment and the 
Judgment was signed by the Court on May 13, 1986. [R. 58-59] 
Not until five months after the Judgment was entered did Cranney 
ever contend that the Judgment should not have been entered even 
though she undeniably knew the Judgment was being entered. For 
example, in a letter which Cranney wrote to Dukane's counsel on 
July 10, 1986, Cranney did not contend that the Judgment had 
been improperly entered. Rather, Cranney simply notified 
counsel that in a recently concluded divorce proceeding her 
former husband had been ordered to pay the Judgment and asked 
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that further correspondence concerning the Judgment be sent to 
him. [R. 65] 
Cranney took no action to attempt to set aside the 
Judgment that was entered against her until after Dukane filed a 
fraudulent conveyance action against Cranney in the District 
Court for Carbon County, Civil No. CV014924, seeking a 
determination that a Deed to certain real property which Cranney 
had signed in favor of her mother on May 13, 1986 (the same day 
the Judgment was entered against Cranney in the present case) 
was a fraudulent conveyance. Thereafter, and on October 6, 
1986, almost five months after the Judgment was entered, 
Cranney's attorney belatedly filed a Motion to vacate and set 
aside the Judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. [R. 60, 
126] On November 3, 1986, the District Court denied Cranney's 
Motion to set aside the Judgment on the basis that the Motion 
was not timely filed. [R. 77-78] 
Cranney did not appeal the Order denying her Motion. 
Rather, on October 29, 1986, Cranney herself filed a Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment on the alleged ground the Judgment was 
void. [R. 75] One day later, on October 30, 1986, Cranney's 
counsel withdrew as her attorney. [R. 79] Cranney's second 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was denied by Order dated 
November 25, 1986. [R. 102] 
Again, Cranney did not appeal the denial of her second 
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. Rather, Cranney filed yet a 
third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment on December 1, 1986, 
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relying on the same grounds and pleadings previously argued. [R. 
104] That Motion was again denied by the Court, by Order dated 
December 16, 1986. [R. 106] It is from the Order denying 
Cranney's third Motion only that this Appeal was purportedly 
taken. 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
A. Cranney has only appealed the District Court's Order 
of December 16, 1986 denying her third Motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment. This Motion was nothing more than a "Motion to 
Reconsider" the Court's previous Orders. There is no such 
Motion and the District Court properly denied the Motion. 
B. Even if this Appeal were deemed taken from the 
District Court's Orders of November 3, 1986 and/or November 25, 
1986 denying Cranney's first and second Motions to Set Aside the 
Judgment, the Appeal is not timely as it was not filed within 30 
days after those Orders were entered and the filing of the third 
Motion seeking reconsideration did not extend the time for 
Appeal. 
C. Even if a timely Appeal had been taken from the Order 
of November 3, 1986, refusing to set aside the Judgment on the 
ground of excusable neglect, the District Court acted properly 
as that Motion was not timely as it was not made within three 
months after the Judgment was entered.I 
D. Even if Cranney had timely appealed from the Order of 
November 25, 1986, refusing to set aside the Judgment on the 
ground the Judgment was void, the District Court acted properly 
as the Judgment was not void for lack of notice. The District 
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Court was not bound to accept Cranney's story that she did not 
receive notice of the final Pretrial and Cranney did in fact 
receive adequate notice of the Judgment, 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The District Court Did Not Err in Denying Cranney's 
Third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment From Which This Appeal is 
Taken. 
The only Order of the District Court which Cranney has 
appealed from is the Order of December 16, 1986, denying 
Cranney's third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. That Motion 
simply rehashed the same grounds previously urged by Cranney for 
setting aside the Judgment and was nothing more than an attempt 
by Cranney to pursuade the Court to reconsider its previous 
decisions refusing to set aside the Judgment. The District 
Court properly denied Cranney's Motion as there is no such 
animal as a "Motion to Reconsider". Utah State Employees Credit 
Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 (1970); Drury v. 
Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 (1966). 
Accordingly, as Cranney has only appealed from the 
District Court's refusal to reconsider its previous Orders and 
not the previous Orders themselves, the correctness of the 
previous Orders is not even before this Court. The Order 
appealed from should be affirmed because it was not error for 
the District Court to refuse to reconsider its previous Orders. 
B. Even if This Appeal is Deemed Taken From the Previous 
Orders, the Appeal is Not Timely. 
As previously stated, Cranney has only appealed from the 
District Court's Order of December 16, 1986, denying Cranney's 
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third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment* However, even if this 
Appeal were deemed taken from the Orders of November 3, 1986 
and/or November 25, 1986, denying Cranney's first and second 
Motions to Set Aside the Judgment, the Appeal is not timely 
because this Appeal was not filed until December 30, 1986, more 
than 30 days after each Order was entered. 
This Court has ruled on more than one occasion that the 
filing of a Motion to Reconsider an Order does not extend the 
time for filing a Notice of Appeal with respect to that Order. 
TransAmerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425 (Ut. 
1986); Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Ut. 1980). The running of 
the time for Appeal is only terminated by a timely-filed Motion 
to alter or amend or for a new trial. Albretson v. Judd, 709 
i 
P.2d 347 (Ut. 1985). | 
C. Even if a Timely Appeal Had Been Taken From the 
November 3, 1986 Order, That Order Was Proper. 
Even if, contrary to what is argued above, Cranney had 
purported to appeal from the Order of October 3, 1986, denying 
her first Motion to Set Aside the Judgment, and even if that 
Appeal had been timely, the District Court did not commit error 
in refusing to set aside the Judgment on the ground of excusable 
neglect. 
The Judgment was entered against Cranney on May 13, 
1986. Cranney did not move to set aside the Judgment on the 
ground of excusable neglect until approximately five months 
later on October 6, 1986. A Motion to set aside a Judgment for 
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure must be made within three months after entry of the 
Judgment. See, e.g.f Pitts v. McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Ut. 
1977); Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (Ut. 1979).1 
D. Even if Cranney Had Timely Appealed From the November 
25, 1986 Order, That Order Was Proper. 
On October 29, 1986, Cranney filed her second Motion to 
Set Aside the Judgment on the purported ground that the Judgment 
was void. The denial of that Motion by the Court by Order dated 
November 25, 1986 was not appealed. However, even if that Order 
had been appealed in a timely fashion, the Court did not commit 
error in denying the Motion. 
Cranney erroneously argues that the Judgment entered 
against her is void on the alleged basis that she did not 
receive the notice of the final Pretrial Conference mailed by 
the Court and that, in any event, the notice of the final 
Pretrial did not sufficiently inform her that if she did not 
attend the final Pretrial Conference that Judgment could be 
entered against her. Cranney's argument is simply wrong. 
In the first place, the District Court was not bound to 
accept Cranney's story that she did not receive the notice of 
Although Cranney never sought to set aside the Judgment 
under Rule 60(D)(7), which authorizes a Judgment to be 
set aside for "any other reason justifying relief", 
that subsection would have been to no avail. This 
Court has held on a number of occasions that where a 
ground for setting aside a Judgment is included in 
subsections (1) through (4) of Section 60(b), a party 
cannot avoid the three-month time limitation by seeking 
relief under subsection (7). Matter of Estate of 
Pepper, 711 P.2d 261 (Ut. 1985); Larson v. Collina, 684 
P.2d 52 (Ut. 1984). 
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the final Pretrial. The notice of the final Pretrial was mailed 
to Cranney by the Court at the same address that a number of 
other notices were mailed and admittedly received by Cranney. 
In this regard, Cranney does not deny that she received the 
notice of the Scheduling Conference held on March 3, 1986. Yet, 
Cranney did not attend that conference either. Further, Cranney 
does not and cannot deny that she received a copy of the 
proposed Judgment which was mailed to her on May 6, 1986. That 
Judgment specifically recited that Cranney had failed to appear 
at the final Pretrial and that Judgment was therefore being 
entered against her. Notwithstanding her receipt of the 
proposed Judgment, Cranney took absolutely no action to object 
to tne Judgment being entered. In this regard, it is apparent 
that Cranney did not decide that the Judgment had been 
improperly entered against her until months after the fact. For 
example, in July 1986, Cranney sent Dukane's counsel a letter. 
In that letter she did not object that the Judgment had been 
improperly entered or claim that she was entitled to her day in 
Court. Rather, she simply stated that in a recently concluded 
divorce action, her former husband had been ordered to pay the 
Judgment and told counsel to contact him concerning payment of 
the Judgment. 
Second, the notice of the final Pretrial mailed to 
Cranney specifically advised her that her non-appearance could 
result in an Order striking her pleadings. This language in the 
notice was, in fact, underlined by the Court. And, the proposed 
Judgment clearly notified her Judgment was going to be entered. 
- i i -
In summary, the District Court clearly acted properly in 
determining that the Judgment was not void and denying Cranneyfs 
second Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the December 16, 1986 Order of the District Court denying 
Cranney's third Motion to Set Aside the Judgment should be 
affirmed. In the alternative, and in the event this Appeal is 
deemed taken from the earlier Orders of the District Court, the 
Appeal should be dismissed as it was not timely filed. 
DATED this day of June, 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
4994/40 
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